What lessons does Holocaust education hold for preservice teachers and how does Holocaust education aid their growth as social justice educators? In this qualitative teacher research study we attempt to answer these questions by analyzing the coursework and reflections of 16 social studies preservice teachers (PSTs) as they completed an in-depth study of the Holocaust through historical research, field trips, and reading young adult literature, and designed creative and engaging lessons to teach the Holocaust to secondary social studies students (grades (...) 6-12). Findings reveal “blind spots” in the PSTs Holocaust-related content knowledge, pedagogy, ability to make connections between the historical event and their students’ lives, and their acceptance the role of social justice education (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Over the course of the study, the PSTs improved their content and pedagogical knowledge, and took their first steps towards becoming social justice educators. We also found that for PSTs, taking on the role of Holocaust educators and social justice educators takes time and practice This study broadens scholarship on many common concerns in teacher education, such as dispositions, multicultural education, and teaching for social justice. The findings inform teacher educators, teacher candidates, and practicing teachers on the connections between Holocaust and social justice education, and provide a model for teaching social studies for social justice. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

In this thesis I shall summarize and critically examine the central features of the theories of values of four contemporary moral philosophers: A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson, R.M. Hare, and P.H. Nowell - Smith. I shall first look back, however, to the theory of moral philosophy of the most influential 'forefather' of this group, David Hume. Hume's theory stands as a challenge to moral philosophers who would assume that moral judgments are primarily, in some sense, acts of 'reason'. Although our (...) four contemporaries follow Hume in this, his challenge, in the form I shall indicate shortly, will provide the main theme for this thesis. (shrink)

More than half of the book is devoted to what is almost a catalogue exposition of Western moral philosophy from Kant to Nowell-Smith. Although the author claims in the preface to have included "suitable references to Indian points of view, including the Buddhist," what references there are are usually too general, and never fully explained to be of any use to Western readers. Exposition tends to be disjointed, and the English leaves much to be desired. On the whole there (...) is much eclecticism and little originality.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

For many years past English moralists have been occupied, almost exclusively, with the analysis of ethical terms. Ethics Since 1900 has the great merit of making this involved and often tedious discussion intelligible to the educated public. Mrs. Warnock begins with Bradley, works her way through the intuitionists, the emotivists and her Oxford colleagues, Urmson, Hare and Nowell-Smith, and ends with a long chapter on Sartre and a concise account of the modern discussion concerning freedom of the will. Since (...) the remainder of this review is taken up with a discussion of the book’s only notable shortcoming, it is well to affirm at once that, as a popular account of recent work in ethics, it is an unqualified success. It is not, of course, as representative as the title suggests; obviously it was first conceived as a work on English ethics, the chapter on Sartre being added as an encouragement to English moralists to follow his unfashionable example and formulate some moral opinions of their own. (shrink)

H. D. Lewis gave the Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh in 1966–1968. In The Elusive Mind and in The Elusive Self he expanded on the substance of the Lectures devoted to the defense of mind-body dualism and the self-identity of the person, respectively. The present book “rounds off” the first part of the final volume, The Elusive Self and God. Once more we are indebted to Lewis’s surgical finesse as he defends his libertarian view of free will against both more familiar (...) objections and recent ones—as in Nowell-Smith, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Donald Davidson. This review is confined to key theses in Lewis’s concept of the self as moral agent. (shrink)

This article examines Harold Ramis’s 2005 noir comedy _The Ice Harvest_ as the critically dystopian counter-panel to his beloved 1993 film _Groundhog Day_, a film frequently discussed within the paradigm of utopia. While starkly different in genre, tone, and reception, the two films comprise a dialectical dyad that registers the historical transition from the utopian cultural effervescence of the early 1990s to the tragic foreclosure of imaginative horizons and the dystopian transformation of economic, political, and social landscapes in the new (...) millennium. In _The Ice Harvest_, the author argues, this is achieved through a strategic reactivation of film noir as a variant of the critical dystopia. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Active Euthanasia and Assisted SuicidePat Milmoe McCarrick (bio)Although the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in its 1983 report, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, described the words and terms "euthanasia," "right to die," and "death with dignity" as slogans or code words—"empty rhetoric," (I, p. 24), the literature reviewed for this Scope Note continues to use these terms. Therefore, to (...) discuss the termination of a patient's life by a physician at the patient's request, the phrase active euthanasia is used, and the supplying of a means by a physician whereby a patient can end his or her life is referred to as assisted suicide.Euthanasia, either as the "good death" from classical Greek or "mercy killing" to end unbearable suffering in the dying, has long been a topic of interest in western civilization (III, Brody 1989). In recent years, public awareness of this discussion about control over the time of one's death has been informed by a series of well-publicized events. They include the November 1991 rejection by a vote of 54 percent to 46 percent of the Washington state Initiative 119, which would have allowed the option of requesting one's physician to "aid-in-dying" for adult patients in a "medically terminal condition" (V, Gross 1991); two medical journal articles describing physician's actions in helping bring death to two patients (V, Anonymous 1988; V, Quill 1991); Dr. Jack Kevorkian's assistance in the suicide of three women (V, Belkin 1990; V, Wilkerson 1991); and the best seller status of a how-to book on committing suicide with opiates obtained from a physician (III, Humphry 1991).For the most part, material included in the annotated bibliography in Scope Note 18 has been chosen from works published in the four years since "It's Over, Debbie" (V, Anonymous 1988) appeared in early January 1988 in the Journal of the American Medical Association.Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino (V, 1991, pp. 3118-19) presented opposing views about active voluntary euthanasia as follows:Those who favor voluntary euthanasia argue that it is a beneficent and compassionate act; it respects autonomy by preserving the patient's control of the manner, method, [End Page 79] and timing of death; it takes the matter outside the reach of "medical power" (accessed in this Scope Note's bibliography at V, Fletcher 1973; V, Nowell-Smith 1989) and scrupulosity; and it prevents the injustice that allows some patients to choose death by refusal of life-support measures, while denying others the right to do so by active euthanasia....The opponents of active euthanasia argue that it undermines the value of, and respect for, all human life (V, Kass 1989; V, Coyle 1990; V, Singer 1990). They fear that guidelines cannot avoid sliding down the "slippery slope" to involuntary euthanasia and selective devaluation of the lives of the most vulnerable among us.... If euthanasia is legal, it is predicted that patients will feel subtle pressure to conform so as to relieve the economic and emotional burdens they impose on family and friends.Euthanasia, its opponents further argue, is socially destructive: it undermines trust in physicians, desensitizes society to killing, and imperils the ground already gained in legitimating passive euthanasia(IV, Wolf 1989).Physicians were not particularly involved with a patient's death until after World War II when participation grew in proportion to the growth of technology. Since the complex, life-sustaining equipment that could forestall death was located in a hospital, death itself became almost completely medicalized (V, Dagi 1991). For terminally ill persons who would like to die a painless death, either by their own hand or with assistance, physicians have almost a monopoly on obtaining strong drugs for distribution to patients (V, Abrams 1990).Active euthanasia for human beings is not legalized anywhere in the world (V, VonDrehle 1991). It is classified as homicide or murder in all fifty states and in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and the Phillippines (V, Nerland 1989). Twentysix states in the United States prohibit assisted suicide by statute (V, Rosenblum 1990).In 1969 in the Netherlands, a physician named Jan Hendrik van... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:25 MORALITY AS A BACK-UP SYSTEM: HUME'S VIEW? The sense of duty is a useful device for helping men to do what a really good man would do without a sense of duty..... Nowell-Smith A certain picture of morality — arguably a Humean one — has come to have a prominent place in contemporary philosophy. On this picture, morality, as Richard Brandt asserts, is "a back-up system, which (...) operates when spontaneous personal caring fails 2 to motivate us to do as we ought." Morality — at least in the form of moral principles, whose force is felt through one's sense of duty — is, on this view, ideally superfluous. As a guide for one's own conduct it is needed only insofar as the agent's affective network is deficient. If one only spontaneously desired a, cared about b, cared for c, felt aversion towards d as, ideally, one should, moral principles and a sense of duty would be of no use. There are good reasons for supposing that this is Hume's view. After all, his characterization of acting from duty is more than a little disparaging: When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that motive, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself,,as much as possible, his want of it. I will argue, however, that there is tension in Hume's ethics between two lines of thought. According to the first line of thought, and the one 26 usually associated with Hume, good conduct is conduct which is spontaneously prompted by virtuous desires. Unless our desires either are not what they should be or are motivationally weak, there is no need for mediation or tempering by a sense of duty or moral principles. According to the second line, the very good desires of a very good person may nonetheless need to be filtered, tempered, redirected or checked. This line is most evident in "Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices." Before arguing that these strains of thought are in tension in Hume's ethics, I need to clarify what is at issue and to develop the two competing pictures of moral motivation. First the issue. The issue is not 'Who is better: someone with a sense of duty but corrupt desires or someone with no sense of duty but ideal desires?' Nor is the issue one of the moral worth of actions ('Can an action have moral worth if it is not performed out of duty?') The issue, rather, is how to characterize morally good (or right) conduct. What role, if any, does a sense of duty or a Butlerian principle of reflection, i.e., an overarching, guiding conception of what is right or good which is 'juridically' supreme within the self, play in good conduct? Is morally good conduct ideally a matter of acting as one should from the proper desires? Or should the desires be governed and guided by moral principles? Consider two models of moral conduct. Model I: Morality as a Back-Up System On this picture, wrongness in conduct is traceable to an affective deficiency. The claim underlying this picture seems to be as follows: One 27 acts wrongly because one's passions are not quite what they should be. One person cheats in her business dealings because she cares too little about the welfare of others (and too much about her own); another is harsh and abrupt to a student because he cares too little about his students' concerns and is jealous and possessive when it comes to 'his time.' In each case the problem can be traced to an affective deficiency. Hume appears to be supporting this view when he asserts, "it may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no act can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from a sense of its morality' (T 479). A few pages later he writes, "[E]very immorality... (shrink)

Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527-Criticism and interpretation ; Political science-Translating.

This volume includes Felix Noeggerath's dissertation from 1916, published here for the first time in a reliable critical edition. The dissertation represents a daring and far-reaching re-conceptualization of Kantian and neo-Kantian thought that consists in "critique of anti-rationalism," especially in the form of vitalism. Both Kant's and Hermann Cohen's philosophies can be experienced anew through the far-reaching optic that Noeggerath developed - an optic that he reiterates and develops into a comprehensive theory of art in a 1951 essay - republished (...) here, as well. The introduction by Hartwig Wiebebach provides an overview and incisive analysis of Noeggerath's philosophical program, while the afterword by Peter Fenves describes in detail the effect of Noeggerath's thought on Walter Benjamin's own attempts at a critique of anti-rationalism. Altogether, the volume provides a new point of access to the important legacy of neo-Kantian thought in the early twentieth century not only in terms of the systematic philosophy, but also in relation to the theory of art and the philosophy of modern science. (shrink)

This volume commemorates the centenary of Logical Investigations by subjecting the work to a comprehensive critical analysis. It contains new contributions by leading scholars addressing some of the most central analyses to be found in the book.

Screening programmes are becoming increasingly popular since prevention is considered 'better than cure'. While earlier diagnosis may result in more effective treatment for some, there will be consequent harm for others due to anxiety, stigma, side-effects etc. A screening test cannot guarantee the detection of all 'abnormal' cases, therefore there will be false reassurance for some. A proper consideration of the potential benefit and harm arising from screening may lead to the conclusion that the programme should not be offered. A (...) modified utilitarian approach may be used for allocation of scarce resources in health care. Ethics has an important role in this evaluation. (shrink)

The concept of quantum principle is introduced as a principle whose formulation is based on specific quantum ideas and notions. We consider three such principles, viz, those of quantizability, local gauge symmetry, and supersymmetry, and their role in the development of the quantum field theory (QFT). Concerning the first of these, we analyze the formal aspects and physical contents of the renormalization procedure in QFT and its relation to ultraviolet divergences and the renorm group. The quantizability principle is formulated as (...) an existence condition of a self-consistent quantum version with a given mechanism of the field interaction. It is shown that the consecutive (from a historical point of view) use of these quantum principles puts still larger limitations on possible forms of field interactions. (shrink)

Tacitus writes that, by insisting that legionary legates who had not so far held the praetorship should immediately proceed to that office, Asinius Gallus ‘altius penetrare et arcana imperii temptari’. In C.Q. N.S. xvi , 327, I suggested that this demand of Gallus’ was probably probing dangerously deeply into and perhaps threatening to wreck the carefully worked-out imperial promotions system, the working of which has been examined by Birley. It is the purpose of this note to look at a number (...) of examples of such irregularity, which, though not as early as the debate during the course of which Gallus made his suggestion, do at least illustrate the process later in the Julio-Claudian era. (shrink)

In his historical writings, Cluvius Rufus evidently found cause to criticize Verginius Rufus for his conduct on a particular occasion ‘Scis, Vergini, quae historiae fides debeatur; proinde, si quid in historiis meis legis aliter ac velles, rogo igmoscas’. From his reply, it is clear that Verginius automatically understood Cluvius to be referring to an event to which he himself attached great significance: ‘Tune ignoras, Cluvi, ideo me fecisse, quod feci, ut esset liberum vobis scribere quae libuisset?’.